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Resumen: 
 
Desde hace algunas décadas varias subdisciplinas de la 
economía se ven reorientadas hacia el análisis 
institucional. Este desarrollo ha afectado más 
específicamente también a los campos de la macroeconomía 
y la teoría monetaria donde ha llevado a varias 
propuestas de reformas financieras y monetarias de gran 
alcance. Una de las propuestas más exitosas aboga por una 
banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, o sea un sistema 
sin banco central en el cual, sin embargo, los bancos 
puedan operar con una reserva fraccionaria. Este artículo 
comenta varios defectos conceptuales de dicha propuesta. 
Más específicamente, varias alegaciones de los banqueros 
de la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria relativas a 
las supuestas características operativas de este sistema 
se critican partiendo de la teoría económica. Más en 
particular, se denuncia como errónea la alegación que una 
banca libre con reserva fraccionaria llevaría a la 
desaparición del ciclo económico. Además, se realiza un 
análisis de mano invisible lo cual refuerza la conclusión 
que la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria es 
incompatible con los principios éticos y jurídicos 
propios de una sociedad libre.  
 
Palabras clave: banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, 
ciclo económico, mano invisible 
 
Abstract: 
 
Since a few decades several sub-disciplines within 
economics have witnessed a reorientation towards 
institutional analysis. This development has in 
particular also affected the fields of macroeconomics and 
monetary theory where it has led to several proposals for 
far-reaching financial and monetary reform. One of the 
more successful of these proposals advocates a 
fractional-reserve free banking system, that is, a system 
with no central bank, but with permission for the banks 
to operate with a fractional reserve. This article 
exposes several conceptual flaws in this proposal. In 
particular several claims of the fractional-reserve free 
bankers with respect to the purported working 
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characteristics of this system are criticized from the 
perspective of economic theory. In particular, the claim 
that a fractional-reserve free banking system would lead 
to the disappearance of the business cycle is recognized 
as false. Furthermore an invisible-hand analysis is 
performed, reinforcing the conclusion that fractional-
reserve free banking is incompatible with the ethical and 
juridical principles underlying a free society. 
 
Key words: fractional-reserve free banking, business 
cycle, invisible hand 
 
Classification JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, 
P34; 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since a few decades several sub-disciplines within 
the field of economics have been characterized by a 
reorientation towards institutional analysis. Scratching 
the surface of economic phenomena and searching for a 
deeper understanding, economists in several fields have 
rediscovered the crucial role and importance of 
institutions. The explosive growth and development of 
such sub-disciplines as Law and Economics, Constitutional 
Political Economy and the New Institutional Economics, 
among others, all illustrate this evolution. This 
development has in particular also affected the fields of 
macroeconomics and monetary theory. 
As had often been the case throughout the history of 
economic thought, the members of the Austrian School have 
in several respects taken the lead in these recent 
developments. A considerable amount of attention has thus 
in particular been devoted to deepening our understanding 
of the institutional pre-conditions for economic 
coordination in a complex monetary economy, through a 
critical examination and analysis of possible 
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institutional alternatives to the prevailing monetary 
system of central-banking-cum-fiat-money. 
While the scientific interest in the general theme 
of the complex causal relationships between monetary and 
banking arrangements on the one hand and the genesis of 
business cycles on the other is not new, it has been 
revived through recent scholarly contributions.  
A debate has arisen in this connection between two 
opposing views. This debate is relevant to the causal 
analysis of business cycles and has led to important 
refinements and to a perfection of the Austrian theory of 
the business cycle from a comparative institutional 
perspective.  
According to one side of the debate, represented by 
the fractional-reserve free bankers, the root cause of 
the business cycle is central banking. The proponents of 
this view argue that a competitive banking system under 
redeemability in specie and in which banks are subject to 
no legal ceiling on currency issues, or floor on reserve 
ratios, would be inherently stable. According to the 
other side of the debate, represented by the 100 per cent 
reserve advocates, the root cause of the cycle is the 
fractional-reserve nature of banking. The proponents of 
this view believe that a competitive system of 
fractional-reserve banking is characterized by inherent 
instability and advocate a return to banking under a 100-
percent reserve requirement.1
In this paper it will argued, in general, that the 
role of institutions is indeed crucial for the 
comprehension of macroeconomic phenomena such as business 
cycles and depressions, and, in particular, that the 
fractional-reserve free bankers have not made a 
compelling case in favour of fractional-reserve free 
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banking, and that they have misidentified the monetary 
and banking arrangements appropriate for a free society.  
 
 
2. Broadening the Task of Monetary Theory: Towards a 
Comparative Institutional Analysis of Monetary Phenomena 
 
Institutional economics as a scientific sub-
discipline is characterized by a particular kind of 
orientation in economic analysis, namely its focus on the 
interrelationships between the system of rules and 
institutions on the one hand and the social and economic 
pattern of actions (order or disorder) resulting under 
those rules on the other. Institutional economics draws 
inspiration from the insight that Adam Smith´s invisible 
hand (Smith 1937, 423) is invisible only for those who 
are blind to the role and function of institutions. In 
the context of business cycle research this reorientation 
takes the form of a comparative analysis of the effects 
of various monetary and banking regimes, in particular 
with respect to the important issue of the efficacy with 
which the economic system performs its coordinating role.     
In her important book The Rationale of Central 
Banking Vera C. Smith had already set out the main 
starting points of any such approach when she wrote that 
“[a]ny attempt to make a final evaluation of the relative 
merits of alternative systems of banking must look 
primarily to the tendencies they manifest towards 
instability, or more particularly to the amount of causal 
influence they exert in cyclical fluctuations” (Smith 
1990, 192) and that  “[u]nless it can be proved that free 
banking would entirely eliminate the trade cycle and 
general runs on the banks, the argument for the lender of 
 6
last resort remains a very powerful argument in defence 
of central banking” (ibid. 187). 
The scientific theory of the business cycle is thus 
confronted with two distinct though related tasks. First, 
it is a theory of the unsustainable boom; it has to 
explain why, given a credit-driven or policy-induced 
boom, a subsequent bust is inevitable. A second and 
distinct (but related) task consists in explaining why 
the recurrence of boom-bust cycles itself allegedly is - 
or may seem to be - inevitable. It would not be correct 
to suggest that the Austrian theory of the business cycle 
is agnostic with respect to the possible answers to this 
second question. The latter aspect is more closely 
related to the institutional context and requires an 
examination both of the working characteristics of 
actually existing monetary and banking arrangements and 
of the working characteristics of possible institutional 
alternatives to the prevailing institutional form of 
central-banking-cum-fiat-money. 
The latter aspect, because of its counterfactual 
character, is also of a more speculative nature. In 
particular the search will be for the type of 
institutional arrangements in the field of money and 
banking that are most likely to minimize the tendency for 
the market rate of interest to be reduced below the 
natural rate. 
Using an illuminating metaphor, Hayek pointed out 
that “(…) money by its very nature constitutes a kind of 
loose joint in the self-equilibrating apparatus of the 
price mechanism which is bound to impede its working - 
the more so the greater is the play in the loose joint.” 
(Hayek 1941, 408)  
The existence of money breaks any rigid link 
between production and demand. That the link between 
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production and demand is a loose one captures the idea 
that the relationship between production and demand in a 
monetary economy will depend upon how well money performs 
its intermediary role. Hayek recognized that monetary 
changes can cause relative prices to move in ways that 
will create discrepancies between supply and demand. 
Prices can systematically contain wrong information, 
which leads economic activity away from equilibrium. 
Production can thus be temporarily misdirected. 
 However, from a comparative institutions 
perspective, the nature and the extent of these 
disturbances will depend not merely upon monetary policy 
but also, and even more fundamentally, upon the 
institutional framework (monetary constitution) which is 
in place. The economist would not want to imply that the 
extent of money´s “loose-jointedness” – or the amount of 
“play in the loose joint” - and its effects are unrelated 
to the institutional structure.  
Combining these insights, it is now possible 
to characterize more adequately the task of monetary 
analysis and business cycle theory from a comparative 
institutional perspective. The crucial point is to devise 
society´s monetary constitution in such a manner that the 
extent of money´s “loose-jointedness” and the harmful 
effects thereof are “minimized” so to speak, that is, 
reduced to a conceivable minimum, while at the same time 
the general benefits which money as a generally accepted 
medium of exchange confers upon society are safeguarded. 
The essential “loose-jointedness” of money means that the 
use of a generally accepted medium of exchange (money) is 
not only welfare-enhancing, that is, it brings gains to 
society, but that it equally entails certain costs and 
risks.  
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Therefore society´s monetary institutions 
should be devised in such a manner that an “optimal” 
balance is attained between assuring the benefits and 
gains the use of money confers on society on the one hand 
and avoiding (or limiting) the costs and risks resulting 
from the “looseness of the linkage” provided by money on 
the other. While the economic system clearly cannot and 
should not be turned into a barter-like system, since 
money can never be strictly neutral, the task is 
nevertheless to make explicit the kind of monetary “rules 
of the game” that will allow to approximate as much as 
possible this “optimum”. Austrian business cycle research 
thus comprises an important comparative institutional 
(or, as some would say, “constitutional”) dimension.  
 
3. A Reminder: The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle 
 
The Austrian theory of the business cycle emerges 
from a straightforward comparison of savings-induced 
growth which is sustainable, with a credit-induced boom, 
which is not sustainable.2 An increase in saving by 
individuals and a credit expansion orchestrated by the 
central bank set into motion market processes whose 
initial allocational effects on the economy´s capital 
structure are similar. The ultimate consequences of the 
two processes stand in stark contrast, however. Whereas 
saving entails genuine growth, credit expansion leads to 
boom and bust. 
If market participants´ time preferences, i.e. their 
degree of preference for present over future goods, 
falls, then they will tend to consume less now and save 
and invest more; at the same time, and for the same 
reason, the rate of interest will fall. A decrease in the 
interest rate causes resources to be transferred from the 
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late and final stages to the early stages. The structure 
of production is thus modified. It will now be depicted 
by a Hayekian triangle with a longer time-dimension leg 
and an (initially) shorter consumable-output leg. The 
time profile of consumption thus becomes skewed toward 
the future. In a genuine savings-induced boom increased 
investment in longer-term projects is thus consistent 
with the underlying economic realities.  
This is not true in the case of a policy-induced 
artificial boom. In the hypothesis of an artificial boom, 
the change in the interest-rate signal and the change in 
resource availabilities are at odds with one another. If 
the central bank pads the supply of loanable funds with 
newly created money, the interest rate is lowered and 
long-term investment projects are being initiated, just 
as in the case of an increase in saving. However, in the 
absence of an actual change in time preferences, no 
additional resources for sustaining the policy-induced 
boom are freed up. In fact, facing a lower interest rate, 
people will save less and spend more on current 
consumables. In other words, the central bank´s credit 
expansion drives a wedge between saving and investment; 
it results in an incompatible mix of market forces. 
Malinvestment and overconsumption will be observed. Of 
course, as the market guides these new long-term 
investment projects into their intermediate and later 
stages, the underlying economic realities become 
increasingly clear and ultimately re-affirm themselves. 
Entrepreneurs will encounter resource scarcities 
that are more constraining than was implied by the 
pattern of wages, prices, and interest rates that 
characterized the early phase of the boom. The bidding 
for increasingly scarce resources and the accompanying 
increased demands for credit put upward pressure on the 
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interest rate. On the eve of the bust, “distress 
borrowing” allows some producers to finish their projects 
and minimize their losses. At the same time, the high 
interest rates cause people to curtail their consumption 
and to save instead. Where “overconsumption” had first 
been observed, “forced saving” now takes place. The 
change in saving is far short of sufficient, however, in 
comparison to the saving actually needed to see the 
policy-induced investments through to completion. The 
ensuing period of liquidation involves higher-than-normal 
levels of unemployment. 
Clearly the consumption and investment magnitudes 
will not simply return to their previous pre-boom 
sustainable levels. Given the intertemporal 
disequilibrium created during the boom, needed 
liquidation may well take the economy inside its 
production possibilities frontier (PPF). Under favourable 
conditions, market forces may bring business decisions 
back into conformity with actual consumer preferences. 
There is clearly also a danger, however, especially in 
the face of ill-conceived policy actions by the monetary 
and fiscal authorities, that the recovery phase will be 
preempted by spiraling downward into deep depression, 
that is, self-reversing changes in the capital structure 
may give way to a self-aggravating downward spiral in 
both income and spending.3
 
 
4. The Problems of Central Banking 
 
The stabilization policies of the central banks have 
not led to the disappearance of the business cycle. 
Furthermore the problems facing systems with a central 
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bank are undeniably real and have to some degree also 
been acknowledged in the orthodox mainstream literature. 
In this respect reference can be made to the 
literature dealing with time inconsistency and the 
inflation bias under discretionary policy.4 The analysis 
of time inconsistency in monetary policy has provided a 
theoretical framework for thinking formally about 
credibility issues, and has led to an examination of the 
actual incentives faced by central banks. The further 
development of this strand of thought has led to an 
attempt to spell out some normative implications for the 
design of monetary institutions. Thus it has been 
suggested that the government might for instance delegate 
monetary policy to an independent central banker that is 
“conservative” in the sense of placing a higher relative 
weight on inflation stabilization than does society as a 
whole; or the government might attempt to design an 
optimal incentive structure by offering the head of the 
central bank a state-contingent wage contract. (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff 2002, 641 ff.) 
Nevertheless, in all of this literature, the 
prevailing institutional form of central-banking-cum-
fiat-money remains unquestioned and its continuing 
existence and legitimacy are in fact taken for granted. 
In other words, these authors do not extend their 
normative and critical reflection towards proposals for 
more radical alternatives to the prevailing institutional 
regime of central-banking-cum-fiat-money. 
 
 
5. Hayek´s Proposal for the Denationalisation of Money 
 
The scientific interest in more radical alternatives 
to prevailing institutional forms had been stimulated 
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towards the end of the 1970s by F. A. Hayek´s proposal 
for the denationalisation of money. (Hayek 1991)  
Hayek envisioned a market in which all issuers, 
public and private, would offer non-redeemable 
currencies, each currency constituting its own monetary 
standard. Each private issuer would pledge to maintain 
purchasing-power stability in terms of a particular 
basket of goods, but this pledge would not take the form 
of an enforceable redemption contract. Thus Hayek, who 
had always been skeptical toward free banking, did not 
suggest free competition among banks offering wholly or 
fractionally backed liabilities redeemable for a 
commodity money. Instead he speculated that private 
producers of fiat-type monies bearing legally protected 
brand names would outcompete both commodity-based monies 
and government fiat monies by promising greater stability 
of purchasing power. Each issuer would pledge to hold the 
purchasing power of its money constant in terms of a 
specified price-index basket, but the pledge would not be 
a legally enforceable commitment of the sort embodied in 
a redemption contract. 
 
Hayek´s proposal has provoked at least two forms of 
fundamental criticism. First, as Prof. Rothbard has 
reminded, it might be doubtful whether Hayek´s system 
would be able to pass the market test in view of Mises´s 
regression theorem. (Rothbard 1997a, 154 ff., 366 ff.) 
The feasibility of private fiat-type money is thus 
doubtful in view of the regression theorem.5 The latter 
raises doubts about whether it would be possible at all 
to get a system based on private fiat-type money off the 
ground in the first place. A new fiat money must at first 
be linked to an established money through a fixed rate of 
exchange. Otherwise would-be users of the new money will 
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have no means for assigning any future purchasing power 
to it and no basis for demanding definite quantities of 
it. Prof. Selgin has likened the initial redeemability of 
a new fiat money (or fixed exchange rate) to a “launching 
vehicle” that can fall away once the new currency gets 
into orbit.6
Prof. White has pointed to a further problem with 
respect to Hayek´s proposal: this system might face a 
time-inconsistency type of problem. (White 1999, 227 ff.) 
The question can be raised of whether the keeping of such 
a non-enforceable pledge would be consistent with profit 
maximization. Arguably a profit-maximizing fiat-type 
issuer could choose to hyper-inflate its own brand of 
money, and would do so if staying in business promised 
less than the one-shot profit available from an 
unanticipated hyperinflation. 
 
As a result of these criticisms, in more recent 
times monetary economists working in this tradition    
have devised different proposals for fundamental monetary 
and financial reform. Although some of these use Hayek´s 
work as a source of inspiration, most recent proposals 
deviate considerably from Hayek´s specific original 
proposal in their “details”.  
 
 
 
6. The Strong Claims of the Fractional-Reserve Free 
Bankers: A Manifold Critique 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The case for fractional-reserve free banking 
consists of a conglomerate of more or less interrelated 
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claims, all of which are highly questionable on 
theoretical grounds. These claims are not limited to the 
contention that fractional-reserve free banking, if it 
were installed, would lead to the disappearance of the 
business cycle.  
Nevertheless it has to be acknowledged that the 
theoretical starting point of the fractional-reserve free 
bankers is not entirely without merit to the extent that 
it is recognized that the complex issues and problems 
raised by the loose linkage provided by money – Hayek´s 
“loose joint” - can be illuminated against the background 
of Say´s Law. The free bankers recognize that the 
textbook model of the Classical economists should be 
complemented by an account of how money and the banking 
system work to ensure the valid insight behind Say´s Law. 
They thus conceive of Say´s Law as a conditional 
proposition.7 They generally misconstrue the classical 
meaning of Say´s Law, however; in particular they 
misidentify the appropriate “monetary rules of the game” 
of a free society. 
As will become clear further, it is not too 
difficult to offer a convincing conceptual refutation of 
the claim that the business cycle would disappear under a 
system of fractional-reserve free banking. Simply 
refuting that claim, however, might still leave open the 
possibility that recurrent business cycles and systematic 
intertemporal discoordination are inherent in the normal 
functioning of the free, unhampered market. Therefore a 
more comprehensive critique of fractional-reserve free 
banking is appropriate, in order to establish the correct 
meaning to be attached to the notion of free banking, 
which is different from the one favoured by the 
fractional-reserve free bankers.  
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Since the “free market” is ultimately always defined 
in terms of the institutional constraints and rules to 
which the actions and interactions of market participants 
are subject, attention is in this context also to be 
devoted to the ethico-juridical dimension and issues 
involved. 
 
 
6.2. Historical Evidence 
 
Historical evidence generally supports the case 
against fractional-reserve free banking. (Huerta de Soto 
2006, 701 ff.) The main dissenter is Prof. L. White who 
has argued that the Scottish free banking system had 
operated for over a century (1716-1845) in a stable, 
efficient and competitive manner. (White 1995)8
Historical evidence by itself, however, because of 
its highly complex character and since it is often 
incomplete and sometimes also ambiguous, is unlikely to 
establish the case against fractional-reserve free 
banking in a fully convincing manner. Therefore a 
thorough conceptual critique of fractional-reserve free 
banking is required. This critique focuses on the ethical 
and legal perplexities and inconsistencies inherent in 
the proposal for fractional-reserve free banking, as well 
as on an exposure of the theoretical flaws in the 
fractional-reserve free bankers´ account of the working 
characteristics of this system.   
 
 
6.3. The Mechanics of Fractional-Reserve Free Banking 
According to its Advocates: Would Fractional-Reserve Free 
Banking Be Proof Against Systematic Intertemporal 
Discoordination and Business Cycles? 
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The fractional-reserve free bankers distinguish 
between a “non-arbirary” and an “arbitrary” change in the 
supply of bank-issued liabilities according to whether or 
not such changes are effectuated by the banks in response 
to a change in the desire of the public to hold on to 
bank liabilities. Since the effects of credit expansion 
by the banks are basically similar whether or not the 
credit expansion is accompanied by changes in the demand 
to hold bank liabilities, the distinction between an 
“arbitrary” and a “non-arbitrary” expansion is of little 
intrinsic interest. It is here maintained only for the 
sake of the argument.9  
 
 
6.3.1. “Non-arbitrary” credit expansion under fractional-
reserve free banking: the demand-elasticity of the 
currency supply 
 
According to the advocates of a system of 
fractional-reserve free banking, one of the main virtues 
of such a system consists in the demand-elasticity of the 
currency supply, not only at the level of the individual 
bank – i.e. the supply of money by an individual bank is 
demand-elastic - but also in case of a general rise in 
the public´s desired holdings of currency across all 
brands: a fall or rise in the “velocity” of bank-issued 
money leads to an offsetting change in the stock of bank-
issued money by changing the money multiplier. 
In terms of the equation of exchange, the system 
makes M move to offset changes in V, thus acting to 
automatically stabilize MV, nominal aggregate demand for 
goods, or Py, nominal income. Fractional-reserve free 
banking would thus “automatically” discriminate between 
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real disturbances and monetary disturbances, reacting 
only to the latter, thus also implementing the so-called 
productivity norm.  
Implicit in the productivity norm as espoused by 
contemporary proponents of fractional-reserve free 
banking is the idea that no adverse business-cycle 
consequences as described by the Austrian theory will 
follow an expansion of the stock of bank money that 
merely accommodates a prior increase in the demand for 
money holdings. Such an expansion, instead of adding to 
the flow of spending, merely keeps that flow from 
shrinking. The expansion therefore serves not to trigger 
a boom but to avoid a bust.  
A rise in the demand to hold bank-issued money 
relative to spending implies a fall in velocity (or the 
ratio of spending to money balances). By reducing 
spending flows, and thus the “turnover” of bank-issued 
money, the shift reduces the probability of large adverse 
clearings. Liquidity cost thus falls, and the banks can 
safely keep more liabilities in circulation, and 
correspondingly can make more loans. The rise in its 
liabilities restores equilibrium by pushing back up the 
marginal benefit of holding reserves for the 
representative bank. 
In other words, a general rise in the public´s 
desired holdings of currency, shared by all the banks, 
creates the reverse of a global in-concert over-issue. 
The banks´ reserves are made more than sufficient by the 
reduction in liquidity costs from reduced spending per 
unit of currency. The reduction in gross clearings 
reduces desired reserves by reducing the chance of 
reserve depletion for any given starting level of 
reserves. In response, the banking system will expand its 
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liabilities, raising banks´ desired reserves, until 
desired reserves again match the given stock of reserves.  
In these ways, the supply of money by the banking 
system as a whole is demand-elastic: the banks as a group 
find it profitable to respond to a general rise in the 
public´s desired holdings of currency by raising the 
actual circulation.  
In the new equilibrium, the argument goes, real 
intermediation through the banking system has increased: 
the banking system has a larger volume of liabilities and 
a larger portfolio of assets. This indicates that the 
voluntary holding of bank-issued money is one component 
of the supply of loanable funds. To hold a bank´s 
currency or deposit liabilities is to lend it funds which 
it can then intermediate (re-lend).  
An important pre-supposition in the foregoing 
account is that to hold inside money is by itself (and by 
definition) to engage in voluntary saving. The aggregate 
demand to hold balances of inside money is a reflection 
of the public´s willingness to supply loanable funds 
through the banks whose liabilities are held. Under this 
assumption, if the sacrificed spending is consumption 
spending, the increase in the holding of bank-issued 
currency represents a net increase in the supply of 
loanable funds. 
The pre-supposition is questionable, however, and in 
fact not correct. The concept of saving is confused with 
the concept of demand for money; it is not correct to 
maintain the view that to hold “inside” money is to 
engage in voluntary saving. The holding of money, that 
is, the act of not spending it, is not equivalent to 
saving. (also Huerta de Soto 2006, 694-700)  
The consumption/investment proportion, that is, the 
decision of how much of one´s money to spend on 
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consumption and how much on investment, is determined by 
a person´s time preference, that is, the degree to which 
this person prefers present consumption over future 
consumption. On the other hand, the source of his demand 
for cash is the utility attached to money, that is, the 
personal satisfaction derived from money in allowing him 
immediate purchases of consumer or producer goods at 
uncertain future dates. An increase in the balances of 
“inside” money that the public wishes to hold is 
perfectly compatible with a simultaneous increase in the 
demand for consumer goods and services if the public 
decides to decrease its investment expenditure. 
If the demand for money increases while the social stock 
of money is given, this additional demand can only be 
satisfied by bidding down the money prices of non-money 
goods. The relative price of money versus non-money will 
have changed.10 
However, it is neither possible nor necessary for 
the banks to respond to a general rise in the public´s 
desired holdings of bank liabilities by raising the 
actual circulation.  
First, it is not possible for the banks to 
effectuate any such off-setting. The adjustment will 
already have taken place. In particular it will be noted 
that the market participants to which a particular bank 
grants, say, additional loans and the bank customers 
whose demand for its liabilities has risen are not 
necessarily the same market participants. It is not 
unlikely that these two groups will be composed of 
different market participants. It is even conceivable 
that a particular bank experiences positive clearings 
because other banks temporarily hold its currency instead 
of entering it into the clearing process. Nor is it to be 
excluded that a particular bank, after finding the level 
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of its reserves greater than desired, grants loans to new 
customers, that is, market participants who up to that 
point in time were not (yet) customers of the bank.  
Thus the way in which the system accommodates rises 
in the demand to hold bank liabilities works indirectly 
via the appearance of positive clearings. There is 
nothing in the adjustment process that guarantees that 
the additional quantity of bank liabilities supplied in 
response to such a rise in demand, say, through the 
granting of more loans, is put directly in the hands of 
those very same market participants who have increased 
their willingness to hold on to bank liabilities. It is 
this fact that ultimately throws some serious doubts upon 
the stronger claims of the advocates of fractional-
reserve free banking, such as that the system, through 
its inherent tendency towards monetary equilibrium, will 
equally and simultaneously tend towards a situation from 
which forced saving is absent, in which notional demand 
equals effective demand and in which the benefits derived 
from the operation of Say´s Law are maximized. If the 
analysis is conducted at a sufficiently low level of 
aggregation and if the precepts of methodological 
individualism are consistently followed, then all of 
these claims become highly questionable. 
Second, it is not at all necessary to accommodate 
any general increases in demands of market participants 
to hold on to bank liabilities. Consider a market 
exchange between market participants A and B, A selling 
quantities of a particular commodity to B. A deal or 
transaction between A and B will only take place if the 
minimum money price at which A is willing to sell a unit 
of the commodity, that is the minimum price he wants to 
obtain for one unit of the commodity, is no higher than 
the maximum price B is willing to pay in exchange of a 
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unit of the commodity. Suppose that a “general” increase 
in money demand takes place in the sense that both A and 
B increase their demand for money balances. On the 
seller side this means that A will sell a definite 
quantity of the commodity for a smaller amount of money, 
or stated otherwise, that A will offer a greater amount 
of the commodity for a given quantity of money. That is, 
A is willing to sell at a lower minimum price. On the 
buyer side, this means that B will offer a smaller amount 
of money for a definite quantity of the commodity, or 
will accept only a greater amount of the commodity in 
exchange for a definite quantity of money. In other 
words, B is now willing to buy only at a lower maximum 
price, i.e. the maximum price he is willing to pay for 
one unit of the commodity is now lower. If any 
transaction between A and B still takes place, the money 
price of the commodity at which such a deal will be made 
will tend to be lower than before. In other words, a 
spontaneous adjustment of quantities bought and sold at a 
lower money price for the commodity will tend to ensue.11   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.2. The possibility and likelihood of business cycles 
and systematic intertemporal discoordination as a 
consequence of “non-arbitrary” credit expansion under 
fractional-reserve free banking 
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In fact, the scenario of a “non-arbitrary” in-
concert expansion, as sketched by the free bankers, is 
quite problematic. 
First, it is not made clear why we should ever 
expect a general change in the public´s desired holdings 
of liabilities, shared by all the banks, to occur in the 
real world. It seems more likely that some banks will 
experience an increase in the public´s willingness to 
hold on to their respective currencies, while others will 
not, or not to the same extent. 
 
Furthermore, it can easily be demonstrated that it is 
precisely the feature of free banking that is considered 
its main and most outstanding virtue, namely the demand-
elasticity of the currency supply or the fact that a fall 
or rise in the “velocity” of bank-issued money leads to 
an offsetting change in the stock of bank-issued money by 
changing the money multiplier, which makes the system 
particularly prone to business cycles and intertemporal 
discoordination, possibly on an economy-wide scale.  
 
 
Consider a situation in which a general rise in the 
public´s desired holdings of currency actually occurs, ex 
hypothesi across all brands and in the closed-economy 
case. This is a situation of which we would have to say, 
according to the inherent logic of the theory, that it is 
characterized by a global in-concert under-issue. In 
other words, what happens is the reverse of a global in-
concert over-issue. The banks´ reserves are made more 
than sufficient by the reduction in liquidity costs from 
reduced spending per unit of currency. This results from 
the fact that the reduction in gross clearings reduces 
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desired reserves by reducing the chance of reserve 
depletion for any given starting level of reserves. 
As a consequence an expansion by the whole banking system 
of its liabilities, say, by extending loans, is fully 
justified, that is, according to the theory. Following 
the model of the fractional-reserve free bankers, this 
expansion is what will actually restore monetary 
equilibrium.  
Now suppose that those loans are granted to 
entrepreneurs who spend the additional money on capital 
goods and launch investment projects, thus widening and 
deepening the investment goods structure. It will be 
noted that there is in the model of the free bankers 
nothing that precludes this scenario. These investment 
projects will be undertaken in the expectation that a 
particular flow of credit will be forthcoming in order to 
complete the lengthier production structure. Now suppose, 
however, that the public´s desired holdings of currency 
change again but that this time they decline; again there 
is nothing in the system to preclude this scenario. The 
public spends more again, cutting back its money balances 
previously built up. According to the inherent logic of 
the theory this leads to a situation as if the banks have 
engaged in an in-concert over-expansion. In such a 
situation the risk of reserve depletion is increased 
because the increase in gross clearings widens the 
reserve-loss probability distribution. Each bank will 
feel its risk of running out of reserves too great. In 
the hypothesis of a closed system that has a limited 
quantity of total reserves available, relief from the 
excess demand for reserves requires the banks to contract 
their liabilities in order to re-establish their desired 
levels of illiquidity risk. 
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However, the investments initially made possible by 
the previous expansion will now inevitably and 
necessarily reveal themselves as malinvestments. The 
newly started (lengthened) capital structure will now 
reveal itself as unsustainable. The flow of credit needed 
to complete the lengthier production structure 
(processes) will not be forthcoming as erroneously 
expected. The explanation of this fact is not too 
difficult to find. The new investments in more roundabout 
production processes were not warranted by genuine 
previous saving which is needed to sustain these 
production processes. It will therefore be impossible to 
complete these production processes. 
The free bankers fail to see this problem because 
they conduct their theorizing on too high a level of 
aggregation and do not incorporate heterogeneous capital 
into their model; in other words, their approach is a 
predominantly macroeconomic one. The conclusion is that 
free banking will endogenously generate business cycles 
and economy-wide malinvestment precisely in the type of 
situations in which according to the fractional-reserve 
free bankers this would not be the case, that is, in the 
situations in which changes in the stock of bank-issued 
money supposedly “merely” accommodate changes in the 
“velocity” of bank-issued money. The fundamental reason 
is related to the fact that the lending and investment 
policies of the banks are determined, under free banking, 
by changes in the demand of the public to hold bank-
issued money (the greater or smaller willingness of the 
public to hold on to bank liabilities), and not to 
changes in the social rate of time preference (the 
greater or smaller willingness of the public to forego 
present consumption and to save). The demand for money 
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and time preference are distinct praxeological factors, 
however. 
 
 
6.3.3. The possibility and likelihood of business cycles 
and systematic intertemporal discoordination as a 
consequence of “arbitrary” credit expansion under 
fractional-reserve free banking 
 
 
 
The previous account relates to what from the 
perspective of the model of the free bankers can be 
characterized as a non-arbitrary in-concert expansion, 
that is, an in-concert expansion that “merely” 
accommodates a general increase in the public´s demand 
for bank liabilities. From the perspective of the 
fractional-reserve free bankers, the question of whether 
fractional-reserve free banking would be prone to 
business cycles and systematic malinvestment is indeed 
mostly reduced to the problem of whether an erroneous and 
cycle-generating arbitrary in-concert expansion is still 
conceivable under fractional-reserve free banking, that 
is, a credit expansion that is not accompanied by an 
increase in the demand to hold bank liabilities. It is 
then pointed out that such an expansion, although 
conceivable, is far less likely than under central 
banking since banks in a competitive system have strong 
incentives not to arbitrarily expand in unison.  
The main idea underlying the argument against the 
likelihood of arbitrary in-concert expansion by all banks 
involves a reference to the widening (or broadening) of 
the representative bank´s probability distribution over 
reserve losses. If all banks expand in concert, it may 
 26
well be true that each bank´s average daily net clearings 
may be no different, but the increase in gross clearings 
implies an increase in the variance around that mean, 
creating a need for additional precautionary reserves.12  
An idea similar to that which underlies the square-
root law of precautionary reserve demand – and which is 
derived from a well-known proposition of probability 
theory - can be used, however, to argue that competitive 
banks can obtain economies of scale by pooling their 
reserves of high-powered money. Where possible drains on 
the reserves of individual banks may be assumed to be 
independent of one another, a familiar proposition of 
probability theory ensures that a given degree of 
security for each bank can be obtained with a centralized 
reserve that is smaller than the sum of reserves which 
each bank individually would have to hold. (Laidler 1992, 
197) Thus a tendency towards centralization in banking 
may come to prevail, strengthening any tendency towards 
general in-concert expansion. Moreover, the fact is 
sometimes overlooked that the functioning of the clearing 
mechanism/system provides no check of the possibility of 
in-concert expansion, i.e. expansion by all banks or the 
entire system at once.  
   
 
6.3.4. The fractional-reserve free bankers´ questionable 
uses of quantitative probability concepts 
 
More generally, the methodological legitimacy of the 
use of quantitative probability concepts in the present 
context, and in particular of the law of large numbers, 
can be questioned. 
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In a different context the Viennese philosopher K. Popper 
had made the useful point that all applications of the 
laws of large numbers require an objective interpretation 
and that there exists a fundamental conflict between 
subjective interpretations and all applications.13  
The expression “objective interpretation” refers to a 
theory such as the frequency theory which was developed 
by Richard von Mises. According to this theory, the 
applicability of the probability calculus is contingent 
upon the presence or availability of a Kollektiv. This 
means that the application of quantitative probability 
theory relies on a pre-supposition of homogeneity with 
respect to the phenomena to be subjected to study. 
However, the phenomena belonging to the domain of 
human action do not, in general, fulfill this 
requirement. Human action is not a random phenomenon, nor 
is it deterministic. It is indeed better characterized as 
“purposeful behaviour”. Therefore there can be no 
numerical probability applied to specific individual 
events. Prof. L. White violates this methodological 
precept when he implies that a binomial probability model 
should be used to analyze interactions between banks and 
between banks and their clients. (White 1995, 7)  
The problem identified here is a mistaken pre-supposition 
about the fundamental nature of the phenomena involved, 
rather than incorrect mathematical reasoning. 
It may seem somewhat strange that the problems of 
money and banking give rise to epistemological questions 
concerning the most appropriate interpretation of the 
probability calculus, the legitimacy of using 
quantitative probability concepts etc., but such 
questions cannot be avoided. It was Edgeworth who wrote 
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already in 1888 that “probability is the foundation of 
banking”. (Edgeworth 1888, 113) 
Consider again the question or problem of whether a 
fractional reserve free banking system would endogenously 
generate business cycles. The answer to this question is 
related to the so-called in-concert over-expansion 
thesis. It is a well-known fact that even if it is true 
that the inter-bank clearing mechanism limits and puts a 
check upon isolated expansionary schemes (expansion by an 
individual bank) it does not serve to limit credit 
expansion in a fractional-reserve free banking system if 
most banks decide to simultaneously expand their loans, 
i.e. to expand in unison. 
The free bankers, however, counter this argument on 
the basis of an explicitly probabilistic argument. When 
the banks expand in unison, no bank suffers any increase 
in net average reserve demand, as the expansion does not 
lead to any change in the mean or expected value of net 
clearings for any of the expanding banks. But although 
perfect in-concert expansion does not affect any bank´s 
mean clearing losses, it does increase the variance of 
each bank´s clearing losses, and does therefore increase 
each bank´s precautionary demand for reserves. The so-
called “square-root law” of precautionary reserve demand 
holds indeed that a bank´s demand for precautionary 
reserves for any fixed planning period will be 
proportional to the square root of bank-money payments 
made by its clients during the planning period. 
The critical point made here is not that the “square-root 
law” is based on incorrect mathematical reasoning, 
although the law itself is more often cited than derived 
by its proponents. It is indeed a well-known theorem of 
probability theory that the standard deviation of a 
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binomial probability distribution grows like the square 
root of the number of trials. 
The critical point made here is the more fundamental 
one of whether the process of payments from and to banks 
can be correctly conceived of as a random process, that 
is, a process of the same fundamental nature of, say, a 
binomial coin-tossing game. This is not obviously the 
case, a fact of which Edgeworth, one of the first 
expositors of the “square-root law”, was already clearly 
aware. 
Edgeworth was astute enough to point out that 
the conditions for the applicability of the law of error 
may not be fulfilled when he wrote that “it may be 
objected that some fluctuations in banking business are 
known to depend, not upon a fortuitous aggregation of 
small causes, but upon regular and unique 
events,(…).”(ibid. 114) He further added that “it is to 
be admitted that in banking, as in other departments, the 
law of error is fulfilled with various degrees of 
perfection. The rules of chance apply to the “many-
dimpled” undulations of commercial fair weather, rather 
than to the solitary earthquake wave of a great 
crisis.”(ibid. 115) 
Further in his (1888) article, when 
discussing how to “solve a question which in the opinion 
of some is not devoid of practical interest, namely, how 
large an amount of uncovered Bank of England notes is it 
safe to issue now (…)”, he went on writing that “[t]he 
reserve of the Bank of England presents peculiar 
difficulties. For as it descends, it is subject to 
influences which cannot be treated as fortuitous. It is 
pulled up by the actions of a little knot of persons (the 
Governor and Directors) raising the rate of discount. It 
is pulled down by the panic-stricken public acting, not 
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“independently,” but like sheep. It acquires force by 
going. Returns so originated cannot be regarded as 
analogous to “errors of observation.””(ibid. 122) 
 
Thus we conclude that the first expositor of the “square-
root law” gives evidence of a clear awareness of certain 
limitations to the applicability of the mathematical 
theory of probability to the solution of problems of bank 
management such as the determination of an adequate 
reserve level. Edgeworth (1888) thus took care to 
formulate more reservations than more recent expositors 
have done. Clearly more recent expositors have not always 
manifested the same caution. Where the theory of 
probability cannot apply entrepreneurial understanding 
will resume its role.  
One reason why some advocates of fractional-reserve 
free banking fail to see the problem of the instability 
of fractional-reserve free banking and of the ensuing 
inevitable tendency toward a centralized banking system, 
is thus that they are sometimes too easily implying or 
assuming that the management team of a fractional reserve 
free bank is in a position to determine the optimal 
reserve level in a straightforward manner using 
stochastic optimization techniques. This view in fact 
amounts to the contention that it is somehow possible to 
insure through the application of the law of large 
numbers the exercise of fractional-reserve banking since, 
as the argument runs, banks, in order to fulfill their 
customers´ normal requests for liquidity, and in 
accordance with the law of large numbers, allegedly only 
need to keep on hand, in the form of a cash reserve, a 
fraction of the money deposited with them in cash. 
The reference in this area to the law of large 
numbers is thus equivalent to an attempt to apply the 
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principles of insurance techniques to guard against the 
risk of deposit withdrawals, a risk assumed in advance to 
be quantifiable and thus technically insurable.  
However, this belief is based on a misconceived idea of 
the nature of the phenomena under consideration. Indeed, 
far from the type of events which correspond to the 
natural world and represent an insurable risk, banking 
related phenomena fall within the realm of human action 
and are therefore immersed in uncertainty (not risk), 
which by its very nature is not technically insurable. 
(also Huerta de Soto 2006, 385ff.)  Clearly the events 
related to customers´ more or less massive and unexpected 
withdrawal of deposits from a bank correspond to the 
sphere of human action and are characterized by 
uncertainty, which by its very nature is not technically 
insurable.  
These fundamental reflections raise doubts about the 
possibility and likelihood of the banking system insuring 
itself against the likelihood of in-concert expansion and 
its adverse consequences (malinvestment, bank runs …) 
through uses of the law of large numbers.14  
 
 
 
6.4. The Possibility of Redemption under Fractional-
Reserve Free Banking 
 
As has already become clear from the previous 
analysis, the fractional-reserve free bankers clearly and 
systematically underestimate the potential for 
malinvestment, intertemporal coordination failures and 
business cycles under free banking. There is still a 
different reason, however, why the free bankers fail to 
realize that free banking would be considerably less -
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rather than more – stable than, say, a banking system 
based on a 100 per cent reserve requirement. 
There is one respect in which central banking 
systems seem to be prima facie superior to a fractional-
reserve free banking system. A key characteristic of a 
modern central bank is that it supports the banking 
system by acting as a lender of last resort. A lender of 
last resort stands ready to inject high-powered money 
into the system in the event of an internal drain. An 
“internal drain” occurs when the public´s increased 
preference for holding high-powered money prompts 
redemption of bank-issued money on a scale that threatens 
to deplete a fractional-reserve banking system of 
reserves, and so forces a sharp contraction in the 
quantity of bank-issued money.15
Under a regime of fractional-reserve free banking, 
however, there is no comparable “backstop” in case of a 
redemption run. Clearly the logical possibility of a 
major contraction under free banking due to a redemption 
run - comparable in effect to a shift in the deposit-
currency ratio under central banking - cannot be 
excluded.  
The fractional-reserve free bankers acknowledge the 
fact that increased demands for redemption of bank 
liabilities into specie would generate effects similar to 
the effects of a decline in the deposit-currency ratio 
under central banking. (see e.g. Horwitz 2000, 217) 
One is almost tempted, at this point, to conclude 
that central banking is indeed obviously superior to free 
banking. As is explained further, this temptation must 
nevertheless be resisted.   
The fractional-reserve free bankers distinguish 
between “inside money” and “outside money”.  
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Thus Selgin writes: 
 
“A demand may exist for either of two kinds of money: 
“base” or commodity money-the ultimate money of 
redemption-and inside money (bank notes and demand 
deposits) redeemable in base money. In a mature free 
banking system, commodity money does not circulate, its 
place being taken entirely by inside money. Such being 
the case, the unqualified expression “demand for money” 
used in this study will henceforth mean demand for inside 
money.” (Selgin 1988, 54) 
 
The fractional reserve free bankers thus not only 
distinguish between “inside money” and “outside money”; 
significantly they assume that “demand for money” always 
means demand for inside money; not only does commodity 
money not circulate; it will almost never be held by 
market participants outside the banking system. 
It is assumed that the entire amount of commodity money 
is held by the banks as a reserve in their vaults.  
Considering the entire banking system´s capacity for 
credit expansion and new deposit creation (Huerta de Soto 
ibid. 240), it can easily be demonstrated that the net 
deposits created by the banking system amount to: 
 
DN = d/[c + f/(1-f)]               (1) 
 
where 
 
d : the money originally deposited in the bank´s vault; 
 
c : the cash or reserves ratio maintained by the bank; 
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f : the percentage of money which filters out of the 
system. 
 
The money multiplier formula obtained by fractional-
reserve free bankers Selgin and White is equal to M/B = 
1/r or M = B/r with r = R/M. (Selgin and White 1994, 20) 
This is basically the formula given previously as (1) 
but with f assumed equal to zero: 
 
DN = d/c. 
 
The fractional reserve free bankers indeed 
assume that f=0, or, equivalently, that B = R. The 
fractional-reserve free bankers lay emphasis on the fact 
that the free banking money muliplier is thus independent 
from the public´s desired currency-deposit ratio.         
(Selgin and White 1994, 20; White 1999, 67-68) 
 
 
 
Nevertheless the assumption that B, base or 
commodity money, equals R, or that the entire amount of 
commodity money is held by the banks as a reserve in 
their vaults, is not justifiable on deductive grounds.   
It refers in fact to a special or “limiting” case and is 
presumably inspired by the fact that in some historical 
instances market participants behaved in this manner.  
Clearly it is not plausible to assume both that 
outside money will not disappear and will subsist as a 
redemption medium and that the system will somehow be 
proof against redemption runs, or simply, against the 
willingness of some market participants to hold some 
commodity money outside the banking system. To the extent 
this assumption is not plausible, some more elaborate 
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formula like the one provided as (1) should be 
considered. If outside money does not disappear and if 
there is no market driven path to a purely fiat regime, 
then outside money is and remains the only real money, so 
to speak. Apparently a confusion is going on here between 
money and what is merely a title to money.16
A redemption run would here mean: a sudden 
and significant increase in the desire of the public to 
hold monetary units outside the banking system, that is, 
a sudden and significant increase in f. This type of 
event would entail credit tightening and possibly severe 
deflation. 
Another claim of the fractional reserve free 
bankers now seems unjustified, namely that such a system 
would be better capable of coping with “deflationary 
pressures” than a system subject to a 100 percent reserve 
requirement. In fact the opposite is likely.  
In the mainstream literature discussion 
regarding the susceptibility of free banking systems to 
crises of confidence has often centered around Douglas W. 
Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig´s (1983) influential model 
of bank runs, which has been viewed as showing that a 
harmful instability is inherent to laissez-faire 
banking.17 In their influential paper How Would the 
Invisible Hand Handle Money? fractional-reserve free 
bankers Selgin and White (1994) correctly doubt that the 
run-prone contract posited by the Diamond-Dybvig model 
can plausibly be conceived of as a laissez-faire outcome 
and they explicitly consider several “contractual 
remedies” for the inherent and harmful instability of 
such a bank (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).18 
Unfortunately these authors do not seem to realize 
that they thus implicitly admit not only that the type of 
run-prone contract posited by the Diamond-Dybvig model is 
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unlikely to be a plausible laissez-faire outcome, but 
also that the kind of fractional-reserve free bank they 
themselves favor is equally unlikely to be a plausible 
laissez-faire outcome. As regards the susceptibility of 
both types of banking arrangement to crises of confidence 
and runs, there is in this respect clearly no essential 
difference between a Diamond-Dybvig bank and a Selgin-
White bank.  
These authors´ objection that the Diamond-Dybvig 
bank issues only a peculiar debt-equity hybrid and thus 
lacks an equity cushion whereas real-world banks have a 
distinct class of equity-owners insulating depositors 
against all but the most improbable losses, neglects 
important considerations relating to the cost of capital 
and is thus not convincing.19 The argument relies on the 
suggestion that an adequate amount of capital will weaken 
the incentive of depositors to run on the bank and that 
therefore a fractional-reserve bank needs sufficient 
capital in order to attract depositors. Capital itself is 
scarce, however. In order to attract a sufficient amount 
of capital on the capital markets and to subsequently 
maintain an adequate capital position, a fractional-
reserve bank too will have to offer its actual and 
potential shareholders sufficient return on equity 
prospects, taking into account relevant risk levels. It 
does not yet follow from the fact that a fractional-
reserve bank “needs” capital in order to attract 
depositors that owners of capital (savers, potential 
investors …) will have an interest in investing their 
savings in a fractional-reserve bank. In particular, this 
investment has to yield an adequate return, that is, a 
return that covers the opportunity cost or yield which 
could be obtained on an alternative investment 
opportunity (taking into account relevant risk-return 
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trade-offs). Of such alternative investment opportunities 
there are always many. This remains all the more true in 
view of the fact that the existence of an equity cushion 
as such will not necessarily entirely eliminate the 
incentive depositors may have to be first in line and to 
run on the bank in case of a crisis of confidence.      
Finally, it is not clear why Selgin and White do not 
include 100 per cent reserve banking among the outcomes 
which would likely dominate fractional-reserve banking 
under true laissez-faire. This blind spot constitutes an 
important anomaly in their argument. 
 
6.5. Would the Invisible Hand Vindicate Fractional-
Reserve Free Banking?  
 
 
The argumentation is not yet finished. The thesis 
has now been established that a system of fractional-
reserve free banking would be prone to business cycles 
and systematic intertemporal discoordination as a 
consequence of credit expansion unbacked by genuine 
saving. The occurrence of depressions cannot be excluded 
either. Does this mean that a genuinely free society 
would be systematically plagued by these economic evils? 
 
 
6.5.1. Market evolution and the evolution of rules 
 
The answer is in the negative. A positive answer 
could only rest on the supposition that fractional-
reserve free banking is fully compatible with the ethical 
and juridical principles underlying a free society. This 
supposition cannot withstand serious scrutiny, however. 
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  In fact, for several reasons it cannot be credibly 
maintained that fractional-reserve free banking would 
pass the market test; in other words, fractional-reserve 
banking cannot be conceptualized as belonging to the set 
of institutions which would emerge as the outcome of an 
invisible-hand process, that is, a process in the course 
of which the individual rights of property and contract 
of all market participants would be correctly defined and 
strictly enforced. 
One way in which this thesis can be substantiated is 
through the performance of an invisible-hand analysis. 
The invisible-hand approach to the analysis of monetary 
institutions and their origin was pioneered by the 
Austrian economist Carl Menger in his well-known 
explanation of the origin of money. (Menger 1994, 257 
ff.; 1892 [1994]) In Carl Menger´s account the process 
that eventually leads to the institution of money is 
entirely driven by the separate and independent pursuit 
of individual interests, without any need to rely on 
deliberate coordination of individual efforts. 
In more recent times the invisible-hand approach has 
been revived by the American philosopher Robert Nozick. 
(Nozick 1974) Nozick considers a type of invisible-hand 
processes by which a particular pattern P can be produced 
and which he characterizes as filtering processes. 
Through filtering processes can pass only things fitting 
P, because processes or structures filter out all non-
P´s. If there is a filter that filters out (destroys) all 
non-P Q´s, then the explanation of why all Q´s are P´s 
(fit the pattern P) will refer to this filter. (Nozick 
1974, 21-2)  
The point of performing an invisible-hand thought 
experiment is thus to arrive at useful hypotheses about 
the relationship between certain (kinds of) filters and 
 39
the types of outcomes that can be expected to emerge 
under the operation of these filters, and about how 
different sorts of filters lead to different sorts of 
outcomes.   
 
Invisible hand accounts thus provide us with interesting 
information about the general relationships between 
certain types of “filtering processes” (conditions, 
limiting constraints) on the one hand and the kind of 
outcomes that can be expected to emerge under the 
operation of these filters, conditions or constraints on 
the other. 
The Mengerian account about the origin of money 
provides an answer of this sort; it is sufficient to 
assume that acting individuals separately and 
independently pursue their own interests, that they 
freely engage in exchanges, while supposing that in the 
process they do not violate other individuals´ legitimate 
property rights. In other words, it is not necessary to 
rely on any concerted collective effort or deliberate 
coordination of individual efforts in order to explain 
the emergence of money. 
To be sure, when discussing economic choice, 
spontaneous evolution and invisible-hand processes, it is 
important to be clear and explicit about what level is 
being considered. Menger´s evolutionary account about the 
origin of money is thus a story about evolution within 
rules. A commonly accepted medium of exchange can emerge 
in an institutional context in which property rights are 
already defined, that is, a context in which acting 
individuals respect (do not violate) other individuals´ 
property rights and rights of freedom of contract, in 
which they can thus freely enter into voluntary 
contractual arrangements with each other etc. 
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Apparently not only market outcomes, patterns etc. that 
emerge as the result of market interaction within the 
framework of rules defining or constraining such 
interaction, can be conceived of either as the result of 
deliberate choices or as emerging from evolutionary 
invisible-hand processes. The rules themselves which 
constrain market interaction can also become the object 
of an invisible-hand analysis.  
In the present context it is assumed that the 
theoretical question considered here with respect to the 
possible origins of fractional-reserve free banking 
requires an extension of the invisible-hand approach to 
the level of the rules themselves which constrain market 
interaction, for instance the rules of the law. 
It cannot simply be assumed, however, that both kinds of 
evolutionary process are basically of a similar kind. The 
processes of institution formation cannot simply be 
conceptualized as a kind of market for institutions.  
There is no market for institutions in the same sense in 
which there is a market for, say, potatoes.  
 
This insight raises an important further question: What 
is the selection mechanism operating at the level of the 
evolutionary process with respect to the rules that 
constrain market interaction, such as the rules of the 
law? What is the nature of the cultural selection process 
through which some rules are selected (for) and other 
rules are eliminated or prohibited from emerging or 
subsisting? 
Obviously, and in particular if the outcome of this 
evolutionary process is to be characterized according to 
some pre-defined moral or legal-theoretic standard, or 
with reference to the notion of a “free” or “just” 
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society, this evolutionary process cannot be conceived of 
as a totally unconstrained or unqualified one.  
Following F. A. Hayek, and admittedly simplifying 
matters somewhat for the sake of the argument, the 
solution which is proposed here consists in the 
suggestion that the selection process operating at the 
level of rules can be characterized in terms of the meta-
rules followed by judges when deciding cases. Hayek was 
quite explicit about the meta-rule judges should try to 
implement when deciding cases: 
As in all other fields advance is here achieved by our 
moving within an existing system of thought and 
endeavouring by a process of piecemeal tinkering, or 
'immanent criticism', to make the whole more consistent 
both internally as well as with the facts to which the 
rules are applied. (Hayek 1973, p. 118) 
 
It is here assumed that the agents assisting primordially 
in the selection and evolution of rules are the judges.20 
Even if Hayek is not assuming that the judges of a 
natural law society would be systematically implementing 
libertarian ethical principles when deciding cases, he is 
implicitly assuming that legal rules and practices can be 
subjected to a consistency test and, consequently, that 
proposed rules or practices that are inconsistent with 
the accepted body of traditional law, will be weeded out 
in the evolutionary process through which legal rules are 
selected over time on the basis of court decisions.  
Or at least, on the basis of a normative reading of 
Hayek´s account of the role of judges in a free society, 
this is how it ought to happen. 
It is important to realize, however, that the 
consistency criterion is not identical to the criterion 
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or the requirement that only “traditional” rules are to 
be selected. It does not follow from the mere fact that 
certain rules or juridical practices have de facto 
persisted over a long period of time and can in this 
sense be characterized as traditional, that these rules 
or practices ipso facto satisfy a consistency criterion; 
nor does it follow from the fact that certain practices 
have persisted over a long time, that they will satisfy 
or comply with any other meta-rule or quality standard 
such as a particular ethical ideal or legal-theoretic 
norm. 
There is no reason to believe that the following of 
tradition per se is a reliable meta-rule to be 
recommended to or imposed upon judges. When it is 
asserted that judges follow or ought to follow tradition 
– such as when it is said that they decide cases on the 
basis of custom and precedent – it is more often 
implicitly assumed that the accepted body of existing and 
traditional law is itself the outcome of an evolutionary 
process implicitly governed by a particular meta-rule or 
criterion, such as a consistency norm, and which 
presumably warrants the “quality” of the resulting 
outcome. In other words, it is more often assumed that, 
through the critical efforts of legal experts, flaws, 
internal and external inconsistencies etc. have been 
progressively weeded out over time and removed from the 
body of accepted law.  
As an illustration, the greatness of classical Roman 
jurisprudence does not reside in its “traditional” 
character per se. As Prof. J. Huerta de Soto clarifies: 
 
“The occupation of classical jurist was a true art, of 
which the constant aim was to identify and define the 
essence of the juridical institutions that have developed 
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throughout society´s evolutionary process. Furthermore, 
classical jurists never entertained pretensions of being 
“original” or “clever,” but rather were “the servants of 
certain fundamental principles, and as Savigny pointed 
out, herein lies their greatness.” Their fundamental 
objective was to discover the universal principles of 
law, which are unchanging and inherent in the logic of 
human relationships.” (Huerta de Soto 2006, 24) 
 
It has been contended, and on the basis of 
respectable arguments, that the institution of 
fractional-reserve banking involves a juridical or legal 
contradiction or impossibility. (Huerta de Soto 2006, Ch. 
1 and Ch. 3; Hoppe 2006, Ch. 6 and Ch. 7; Rothbard 1991)  
Granting the well-foundedness of these arguments, the 
proposition that the institution of fractional-reserve 
free banking cannot be expected to emerge as the outcome 
of a spontaneous invisible-hand process, and that the 
invisible hand would thus not vindicate fractional-
reserve banking is then established by a simple 
syllogism. 
 
If and to the extent that judges (or other agents 
assisting in the selection of rules) perform a 
consistency test when deciding cases, and if and to the 
extent fractional-reserve free banking cannot be 
consistently justified from a legal viewpoint (or 
involves a legal inconsistency or impossibility), then 
predictably fractional-reserve free banking will not 
subsist in a society governed by natural law. Such 
contracts will be systematically disapproved by the 
judges (or, more generally, by the agents assisting in 
the selection of rules). 
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Even from an intuitive viewpoint, this conclusion is 
plausible enough. Suppose that a bank and a customer 
somehow agree to enter into an attempted contractual 
arrangement which they label “fractional-reserve 
contract” and which allegedly has certain prima facie 
characteristics of a deposit contract (such as being 
“payable on demand”), except for the fact that 
contracting parties also explicitly agree that the bank 
will have to keep in its vaults only a fraction of the 
money deposited by the customer.  
It is not too difficult to understand why such 
hybrid pseudo-contracts (or so-called fractional-reserve 
contracts) would not likely be very successful. Such 
arrangements would tend to systematically generate 
inherently conflicting expectations and thus become 
particularly susceptible to give rise to recurring 
conflicts and to become the source of repeated 
litigation. On the one hand depositors would expect to be 
able to redeem their notes continually and upon demand. 
On the other hand the banks could not expect to be able 
to fulfill all the promises they have made to redeem 
notes upon demand, since by assumption they have made 
many more such promises than they can possibly keep. 
Furthermore, the costs accompanying such conflicts 
can be considered a particular kind of transaction costs. 
From the standpoint of the banks and their customers 
(depositors), the most obvious way to avoid such costs 
consists in the refusal to enter into such hybrid forms 
of contract. From the standpoint of the judges who have 
to decide cases in these matters, however, such pseudo-
contracts will have to be invalidated.  
Arguably a judge following a hypothetical meta-rule 
of the type “Disallow types of contract that give rise to 
unnecessary or potentially excessive transaction costs” 
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or even more simply “Minimize transaction costs” would 
systematically declare such contracts null and void, thus 
creating a suitable precedent. The meta-rule stipulating 
that judges ought to make sure that legitimate 
expectations match and do not conflict will in this case 
yield a similar outcome. 
 
Fractional-reserve free banking is equally incompatible 
with libertarian ethical principles.21  Thus when it is 
assumed that judges (or other legal experts having to 
decide about the validity of contractual arrangements) 
adjudicate on the basis of libertarian ethical 
principles, a similar conclusion follows as regards the 
problematic character of fractional-reserve free banking.  
We thus seem entitled to conclude that under a 
variety of assumptions regarding the meta-rule followed 
by judges when adjudicating cases (considered 
hypothetically the major agents in society assisting in 
the selection and evolution of the rules of law), the 
institution of fractional-reserve free banking, rather 
than being a highly successful institutional form, would 
more likely be “unfit to survive” and thus be eliminated. 
The interaction patterns that would actually tend to 
develop as the outcome of invisible-hand processes would 
likely be such that the types of successful contractual 
arrangement between banks and bank customers would be of 
two kinds only: these contractual arrangements would be 
either of the irregular deposit contract type or of the 
monetary loan contract type, at the exclusion of hybrid 
(and inconsistent) types of contract. 
To some degree this conclusion is further supported 
by the observation that in the actual world – or the 
world in which we live – the institution of fractional-
reserve banking is actually maintained and kept into 
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existence by interventions and institutions which are 
easily recognized as being incompatible with the 
unhampered market, such as lenders of last resort, 
government-backed deposit insurance schemes, legal tender 
laws, laws that directly curtail the rights of depositors 
and so on. It is also further supported by the historical 
observation that in the absence of such extra-market 
devices and interventions, fractional-reserve banks have 
invariably tended to become bankrupt.  
The central question we have asked previously was: 
How strong are the assumptions which have to be made with 
respect to the meta-rules (filters, constraints…) which 
in a free society govern the cultural evolution and 
selection process at the level of the rules constraining 
the actions and interactions of market participants, in 
order to ensure (so to speak) that a particular 
institutional form - in casu fractional-reserve free 
banking - will be either vindicated or eliminated in the 
process? 
Assuming a Hayekian natural law society in which the 
major agents assisting in the selection of legal rules 
are considered to be the judges, we have arrived at the 
conclusion that it is sufficient to assume that the 
conduct of judges when adjudicating cases satisfies a 
general consistency constraint in order to admit of the 
conclusion that the institution of fractional-reserve 
free banking will be eliminated in the evolutionary 
process. This is not a particularly strong assumption or 
requirement. It asserts merely that judges will (or 
rather, ought to) try to make the law more coherent both 
internally and with, say, “the nature of things”. 
We have also been entitled to conclude, however, 
that under various assumptions regarding possible (other) 
meta-rules to be implemented by judges, a similarly 
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unfavorable verdict as regards fractional-reserve free 
banking seems justified. In a society where judges, 
arbitrators (or other “institutional entrepreneurs”) 
implement the principles of libertarian ethics, 
fractional-reserve free banking would not emerge as the 
outcome of a spontaneous invisible-hand process either. 
And we can even conjecture that under the assumption that 
judges follow a still different meta-rule such as the 
minimization of transaction costs, fractional-reserve 
free banking would not pass the test. This means that the 
argument against fractional-reserve free banking, on the 
basis of an invisible-hand analysis, is fairly robust.  
 
6.5.2. Free banking and the cost of capital 
 
There can be little doubt that the ethical and 
legal-theoretical objections against fractional-reserve 
free banking by themselves already constitute a decisive 
refutation of the proposal for fractional-reserve free 
banking. There are reasons to believe, however, that even 
if from the outset fractional-reserve free banking were 
hypothetically considered fully legitimate from the 
ethico-juridical viewpoint, economic forces would work 
against it.  
One author considers that in a perfectly free 
banking system, everyone must be free to offer any type 
of notes and to charge customers for his services in any 
way he can imagine. And any customer must be free to 
choose the kind of notes and the system of payment for 
services he prefers. Assuming that initially all monetary 
systems are based on 100-percent-reserves, it may seem 
that a transition towards fractional-reserve systems can 
be easily imagined to happen to the extent that these 
systems are preferred by the money producers and their 
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customers entering into mutually beneficial contracts. 
(see Salin 1998) Pursuing this line of argument, it is 
considered that if ever a 100-percent-reserve system is 
optimal - which supposedly means that it better meets the 
needs of producers and users of money substitutes - it 
will be selected by the market, and fractional systems 
will not survive. 
This author pursues, however: 
 
“It is quite true that, during the whole process of 
adjustment from one system to the other, there is a 
multiple creation of money substitutes, with all related 
effects (inflation, excess credits, over-investment, 
etc.). These effects are costly, but they may be viewed 
as a type of investment costs, those which have to be 
borne in order to shift from one given system to another 
preferred system.” (Salin 1998, 64) 
 
However, it should be kept in mind that there will 
obviously be winners and losers in this process. The 
market participants who bear these “investment costs” and 
those who reap the benefits will most likely be different 
persons. The “fractional-reserve contracts” between banks 
and their customers obviously entail external effects 
affecting the property of third persons who are 
emphatically not parties to these contracts. (see 
Footnote 21) 
But even if we make abstraction from the issues 
regarding external effects resulting from credit 
expansion and from the ethico-legal questions involved, 
it is indeed far from obvious that fractional-reserve 
banking would be a successful institution and be selected 
by the “market”. 
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One need only take the previous line of argument one 
step further to understand why this is true. When it is 
contended that a bank and its customers might enter into 
a sui generis contract, say, a deposit contract with a 
fractional reserve, which by both parties to the contract 
is considered to their mutual benefit, one should realize 
that on the part of the bank reference is ultimately made 
to the shareholders of the bank who are the residual 
owners. Especially from the viewpoint of such (actual and 
potential) shareholders of the bank, it is far from 
obvious, however, that a fractional-reserve bank will 
present itself as a particularly interesting investment 
vehicle for those capitalists who look for opportunities 
to invest their savings in the medium to long term, and 
who will take into account all opportunity costs, such as 
the forgone return on possible alternative investment 
opportunities as well as the relevant risk-return trade-
offs.  
The comparison to be made is then no longer 
exclusively with a pure deposit institution, but 
especially also with the type of bank that engages 
exclusively in pure financial intermediation. As appears 
clearly from a comparison of the typical balance sheets 
of a pure financial intermediary on the one hand and a 
fractional-reserve free bank on the other, the latter 
might well find itself in a disadvantaged position in the 
capital markets when it comes to securing an adequate 
amount of capital (equity).  
 
Typical balance sheet of a fractional-reserve free bank 
 
Assets                      Liabilities 
 
Specie (reserves)           Notes and Deposits   
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Bills/Loans                 Equity 
 
Typical balance sheet of a bank engaging exclusively in 
pure financial intermediation 
 
Assets                      Liabilities 
 
Bills/Loans/                Medium and Long Term Debt 
Participations   
                            Equity 
 
 
On the one hand the specie reserve to be held by a 
fractional-reserve bank will generate an opportunity cost 
since these funds cannot be profitably invested. 
Nevertheless, as most advocates of fractional-reserve 
free banking agree, the bank will pay an interest return 
to depositors. On the other hand, a fractional reserve 
free bank will always remain subject to the risk of a 
redemption run in case it loses the confidence of the 
public. A pure financial intermediary is not subject to 
this kind of risk (even if it may have to guarantee a 
sufficient degree of matching between the maturity 
structure of its assets and the maturity structure of its 
liabilities). When the two situations are compared, the 
following tendency undeniably asserts itself: ceteris 
paribus, the fractional-reserve free bank will tend to 
offer lower return prospects for a higher degree of risk.  
This obvious fact has escaped the attention of the 
fractional-reserve free bankers because in their model 
the amount of capital at the disposal of the bank 
(equity) is treated as a fixed parameter. In a more 
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dynamic and complete analysis, however, this assumption 
must be relaxed. 
In a model of fractional-reserve free banking such 
as that proposed by Prof. L. White, holding an extra 
dollar of reserves implies a marginal opportunity cost, 
but also entails a marginal reduction in liquidity cost.  
Optimization requires an equalization of the marginal 
cost and the marginal “return” of holding additional 
reserves. 
In a fractional-reserve bank, keeping an 
additional dollar “idle” as reserve has both a marginal 
return and a marginal cost. Therefore it makes sense to 
balance the two. In a loan or pure intermediation bank, 
keeping an (additional) dollar “idle” always has only a 
marginal cost, that is, there is no marginal return 
involved in holding “reserves”, since the problem of     
incurring a liquidity cost does not arise in this form. 
No “reserves” are to be held. 
From the viewpoint of potential shareholders 
seeking to invest their savings, however, the relevant 
alternatives are (1) investing their savings in a bank 
operating under the principle of fractional reserves 
versus (2) considering an altogether different 
possibility involving no marginal return of holding 
(additional) reserves (since no reserves are to be held), 
that is, a possibility in which the data of the model are 
altogether different. 
For a potential shareholder these two 
possibilities always remain open (given an appropriate 
legal framework). Therefore the potential shareholder 
will take into account the foregone yield with respect to 
reserves to be held if he or she invests in a fractional- 
reserve bank as an opportunity cost that can be avoided 
if he or she invests in a loan bank. He or she will not 
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regard this forgone yield on reserves to be held as a 
cost necessarily to be borne if liquidity cost is to be 
reduced. Liquidity cost can be avoided altogether by 
choosing an altogether different alternative which need 
entail no foregoing of any yield on earning assets 
because no funds are, under this alternative, to be held 
as reserves in the first place. There is no reduction of 
liquidity cost to be balanced with forgone yield on 
earning assets under this alternative. 
Therefore, the true liquidity cost of 
investing in a fractional-reserve bank, as against 
investing in a pure loan bank, is underestimated in this 
model, if the actual choice alternatives of potential 
shareholders are taken into account. Furthermore the 
potential shareholder will of course also take into 
account the risk inherent in the possibly run-prone 
character of the fractional reserve bank. Within the 
context of a fractional-reserve free bank, i.e. from the 
perspective of its management team, acting on behalf of 
shareholders/savers who have supposedly decided to put 
their money/savings at risk in a fractional reserve free 
bank, every additional dollar of reserves entails both a 
marginal gain and a marginal cost. However, from the 
broader choice perspective of the potential shareholder, 
facing a choice between a fractional-reserve free bank 
and alternative investment possibilities and taking into 
account all opportunity costs, there is only a marginal 
cost. There is no need to invest his or her money in a 
possibly run-prone fractional-reserve free bank in the 
first place. Alternatives such as a pure loan or 
investment bank would always be available under pure 
laissez faire. In this sense fractional reserve free 
banks might face an equity maintenance problem. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
Defining and possibly also implementing the monetary 
institutions appropriate for a free society will likely 
become an issue of primary importance in the 21st century. 
Given the ongoing success of the proposal for fractional-
reserve free banking, among economists within but to some 
extent also outside the Austrian School, the task we have 
undertaken in this essay, which is to expose several 
flaws and fallacies inherent in this line of thought, is 
fully warranted. Hopefully our critical reflections will 
stimulate further debate regarding this important subject 
matter. 
 
(*) Ludwig M. P. van den Hauwe lives in Belgium and 
received his Ph.D. from the Université Paris-Dauphine. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Characterizations and/or defenses of fractional-reserve free 
banking are offered in Dowd (1993; 1996 passim), Garrison 
(1996), Horwitz (1992; 2000), Sechrest (1993), Selgin (1988; 
1996, passim), Selgin and White (1994; 1996), White (1989; 
1992; 1995; 1999). Among defenders of 100 per cent reserve 
free banking, mention should be made of Hoppe (1994; 2006 
Chapters 6 & 7), Huerta de Soto (1994; 1995; 1998; 2006), 
Rothbard (1983; 1988; 1991; 1994; 1997a Chapter 18) and 
Skousen (1996); see also the papers in Rockwell (1992). On the 
interdisciplinary character of the debate, see Block (1988). 
The present debate is (only) to some degree reminiscent of 
earlier debates, see Daugherty (1942; 1943); also Rothbard 
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(1995, Chs. 5-7) and Mises (1978, 118-20). For a standard 
account of the role of central banks, see Goodhart (1988). 
2 For recent and excellent accounts of the business cycle see 
e.g. Alonso (2004), Huerta de Soto (2006), Garrison (2001), 
Skousen (1990). Chapter XX of Mises (1998) remains required 
reading.  
3 In fact it is this aspect of the downturn that primarily 
occupied Keynes´s attention in the General Theory. (Keynes 
1997) The typically Keynesian scenario of a “sudden collapse 
in the marginal efficiency of capital” is most likely to occur 
during a period in which the counter-movements of a boom-bust 
cycle have already begun to make themselves felt. 
On “secondary depression”, see also Huerta de Soto (2006, 453-
56). 
4 In particular reference is to be made to the literature on 
“rules” versus “discretion” in monetary policy, see in 
particular the extensive literature following Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), for an 
overview of recent developments, see Walsh (2001, Ch. 8).   
 
5 On the regression theorem, see Mises (1981, 129-46) and 
Rothbard 2004, 268-76). Mises devised the regression theorem 
to solve what he characterized as a circularity problem: on 
the one hand we resort to individual value scales and demand 
schedules in order to explain the formation of money prices on 
the market while on the other hand every time a unit of money 
enters in an individual´s value scale it will do so in virtue 
of its marginal utility, that is, its serviceability in 
exchange rather than in direct use, or its purchasing power 
(“objective exchange value”), which itself presupposes (or 
depends upon) an already given structure of money prices for 
the various goods. Mises argued that although the value of 
money today depends upon today´s demand for money, today´s 
demand in turn depends, not on the value of money today, but 
on its value (purchasing power) yesterday. As we regress 
backwards in time, we must eventually arrive at the original 
point when people first began to use gold as a medium of 
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exchange. If the basis of the present purchasing power of any 
money is some past purchasing power to which agents refer in 
forming their expectations, then a new fiat money cannot be 
created ab ovo. A new fiat money cannot be introduced 
“independently”. Only a commodity-based money can be both new 
and independent. 
6 As Prof. Selgin writes: 
“A fixed exchange rate must (…) serve as a “launching vehicle” 
for placing any new fiat money into circulation. Once the new 
money is in circulation, that is, once it is being widely 
employed as a medium of exchange, the fixed exchange rate used 
to launch it can be jettisoned without undermining the money´s 
continued acceptance, just as a rocket can be jettisoned once 
a satellite is in orbit. The new money, like the satellite, 
may then continue to circulate (albeit, if history is any 
guide, at an ever-depreciating value) by means of that inertia 
which “tends to perpetuate an entrenched use” (…).”(Selgin 
1994, 811) 
Thus a new fiat money must be linked to some established money 
to have a plausible prospect of getting off the ground. 
7 See Sechrest (1993, 49) and Horwitz (2000, 86). For Jean-
Baptiste Say´s statement of the law bearing his name, see Say 
(2001, 132-40); a contemporary statement of Say´s Law is 
contained in Reisman (1998, Ch. 13). 
8 The difficulties inherent in White´s historical thesis are 
highlighted in Huerta de Soto (2006, Chapter 8), Rothbard 
(1988), Sechrest (1988); most authoritative from a historical 
perspective is Checkland (1975). 
9 The terminological distinction which advocates of fractional-
reserve free banking implicitly or explicitly make between 
“arbitrary” and “non-arbitrary” credit expansion – and which 
was suggested to this author in personal communication – is 
not essential and in fact itself arbitrary. Under the 
conditions specified by the theory of the business cycle, any 
credit expansion unbacked by an increase in genuine saving, 
will generate a boom-bust cycle.  
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10 The implicit definition of saving employed by the fractional 
reserve free bankers is nevertheless one that has become very 
common. At least since Keynes´s General Theory, saving has 
been defined as “the excess of income over consumption”. 
(Keynes 1997, 62) 
11 In this connection reference is also sometimes made to a so-
called who-goes-first type of problem. The falling price 
level, the argument goes, is a public good of sorts and each 
actor wishes to reap the benefits of the needed decline, but 
no one is willing or able to bear the cost of starting the 
process. With everyone trying to free ride off the desired 
result, it never occurs. (see Horwitz 2000, 158) As the 
previous considerations already make clear, and in the absence 
of institutional barriers to price flexibility, the who-goes-
first problem is largely if not entirely a pseudo-problem. 
12 The so-called “square-root law” of precautionary reserve 
demand indeed holds that a bank´s demand for precautionary 
reserves for any fixed planning period will be proportional to 
the square root of bank-money payments made by its clients 
during the planning period. 
13 For Popper this means that it is not possible to derive 
objective statistical conclusions, that is, conclusions about 
relative frequencies, from subjectivist non-statistical 
premisses, that is, premisses about degrees of belief. Popper 
later came to embrace the propensity interpretation.(see e.g. 
Popper 1983) The suggestion here is, however, that the theory 
of Richard von Mises still offers a perspective worth to be 
considered in this context. (Mises 1957 [1981]) For Richard 
von Mises the existence of random sequences (or possibly the 
absence thereof) is ultimately an empirical fact. It is the 
task of statistics to identify which experiments have this 
collective-generating property and to elicit the associated 
probability distributions over their class of possible 
outcomes. The starting point of this theory of probability is 
the concept of a collective.  
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14 More generally it will often be possible to characterize the 
decision-making process as being dominated by behavioral or 
endogenous uncertainty, which means that the probability 
distributions attached to uncertain events faced by decision-
makers do not remain invariant with respect to their own 
actions. In other words the data generation process itself may 
change as a result of their actions. Under behavioral or 
endogenous uncertainty, knowledge of the past evolution of a 
system may be of little guide to its likely future development 
because there is no stable and exogenously given data 
generation process that agents can hope to learn about. 
In these circumstances, the necessary basis for a formal 
representation of the process of expectations formation may 
not exist. 
15 High-powered money is money that currently or potentially 
serves as bank reserves. 
16 On the important but sometimes neglected conceptual 
difference between property and property titles, see also 
Hoppe (2006 Chapter 7).  
17 The Diamond-Dybvig result has mainly been viewed as a 
rationale for a government-sponsored deposit insurance scheme. 
In our view the Diamond-Dybvig model primarily serves an 
illustrative purpose. While the Diamond-Dybvig bank is not 
exactly a fractional reserve free bank - there is only an 
analogy or partial similarity between the two - the 
fundamental reason why the Diamond-Dybvig bank gets into 
trouble is the same as in the case of a fractional-reserve 
free bank: it makes promises to pay that, in certain not 
unlikely circumstances, it may not be able to honour. Both 
face a liquidity problem. And both get into trouble because 
they violate and attempt to bridge the insurmountable 
conceptual gulf that separates deposit arrangements from loan 
arrangements. 
18 A type of “run-proofing arrangement” which is often 
discussed is the “option clause”, which would render bank 
liabilities conditionally demandable only, thus turning 
demandable debt into bonds and transforming depositors and 
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note holders into forced lenders. The arguments relating to 
the option clause are not generally convincing, see P.J. Shah 
(1997); also Yeager (1993).     
19 See further section 6.5.2.   
20 Abstraction is here made from Hayek´s views regarding the 
role of legislation. 
21 In recent times this issue has been argued most cogently by 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe. In particular, this author has 
successfully refuted the contention of fractional-reserve free 
bankers Selgin and White (1996) that fractional-reserve free 
banking is in accordance with the title-transfer theory of 
contract as developed by M. N. Rothbard. (1998, Ch. 19) In 
accordance with Rothbard´s contract theory, individuals are 
only entitled to make contracts regarding the transfer of 
their own property. Fractional-reserve banking, however, 
affects the property of third parties in a threefold way. 
First, by thereby increasing the money supply, the purchasing 
power of all other money owners is reduced; second, all 
depositors are harmed because the likelihood of their 
successfully recovering their own possessions is lowered; and 
third, all other borrowers of commodity credit are harmed 
because the injection of fiduciary credit impairs the safety 
of the entire credit structure and increases the risk of a 
business failure for every investor of commodity credit. 
(Hoppe 2006, 200-1)  
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